The Political Turn in Republican Constitutionalism: Left to Right? by Omori, Hidetomi
The Political Turn in Republican 
Constitutionalism: Left to Right?
Hidetomi Omori
Abstract
　In this paper, I examine how the republican constitutionalists have 
changed their political positions. They agree coherently on positioning them 
in contrast to pluralists. But Sunstein and other former republicans saw indi-
vidual rights as institutional products rather than pre-political provisions, 
self-government of the people as interrelated to their rights, and considered 
federalism as an arena where self-government would be realized. However, 
Barnett, a later republican, sees individual rights as natural endowments 
than artifacts, emphasizes them as holding a higher value than self-govern-
ment, and views federalism as a system in which individuals would make a 
free choice. This shift of their position will prove to be described as getting 
less faithful to the historical tradition, recognizing the deliberative process 











　Numerous theoretical studies on constitutional republicanism have been 
published in the 1980s and attracted the attention of many critics. The cul-
mination was probably a symposium entitled “The Civic Tradition of 
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Republicanism” held at Yale University in 1988. It was Cass R. Sunstein and 
Frank I. Michelman who jointly delivered the keynote lectures and devel-
oped the position of republican constitutionalism. Unlike liberal constitution-
alism based on the Lockean theory of natural rights that has been dominant, 
they offered a new interpretation of the U.S. Constitution, illuminating it in 
the light of the civic republican tradition that has been inherited in the his-
tory of Western political thought. Their arguments attracted much attention 
not only in constitutional theory but also in a variety of other areas, gener-
ated followers among leading theorists, and were introduced in Japan as well. 
However, since they did not publish so vigorously on the subject after the 
1990s, such a temporary boom may be described as having been somewhat 
burning down without arousing further controversy.
　In recent years, however, new theorists have surged who have defended 
the U.S. Constitution in the light of the republican perspective. The leading 
figures in this movement are Randy Barnett, Sanford Levinson,（1） and Mark 
Levin.（2） Among them, the representative theorist is Barnett, who is 
attempting to offer a new interpretation of the U.S. Constitution in the name 
of republicanism, as the title of his book “Our Republican Constitution” indi-
cates.
　However, their arguments are not necessarily homogeneous with that of 
the former republican constitutionalists. There are significant differences 
among them, especially in their political tendencies. Sunstein, Michelman, and 
others are generally considered to be politically “liberal” or “progressive.” 
Though simple labeling might not be desirable, they emphasized a different 
perspective from liberalism as a philosophical position. Barnett, on the other 
hand, is considered to be “libertarian” or “conservative” in his defense of 
economic freedom and the market system. Then, have the advocates of 
republican constitutionalism turned their political position? Has republican-
ism come to be exclusively designated by the right, not the left? It is the 
⑴　Barnett admits that the U.S. Constitution is undemocratic in the way Levinson sug-
gests, and Levinson provoked him to write his book and title it “Our Republican 
Constitution.” Barnett 2016, p.26.
⑵　Levin views the constitutional requirement in which three-quarters of the state must 
ratify any proposal emerging from the amendments convention as a process of “consti-
tutional republicanism.” Barnett 2016, pp.216-11, Levin 2013, p.11.






purpose of this essay to examine that political turn.
　In this paper, I examine the political transition by comparing the former 
and the later republican constitutionalists. The structure of this essay is as 
follows: in 2. I confirm the consistent position of republican constitutionalism. 
To this point, both of them prove to share a common stance in positioning 
them in contrast to pluralism and the majority rule. In the following chap-
ters, I focus on several topics, showing the differences between them: in 3., 
on individual rights, in 4., on their relationship to self-government, and in 1., 
on federalism. In 6., I assess their transitions focusing on the historical fidel-
ity, the understanding of the division of institutinal roles, and the possibility 
of being a promising alternative. Through these considerations, the implica-
tions of the transitions will become clearer.
２．Common ground : Contrast to pluralism and the majority rule
Madisonian problem
　Republicans, especially American republicans, tend to define their doc-
trine as hostile to pluralism or the majority rule. There is no difference 
between the former and the later republicans in this regard. Both see the 
socio-political situation in the present day as problematic, just like the fram-
ers of the U.S. Constitution saw it as equally troublesome in those days. 
Therefore, they inherit their predecessor’s tasks sincerely. 
　James Madison, often quoted by contemporary American republicans, 
defended a federal government, a large republic, from a republican view-
point in Federalist Papers, No.10 . The public welfare of the United States, 
according to him, was too distorted by the interests and forces of the domi-
nant majority at that time. What was needed to correct those distortions, to 
placate the tyranny of faction, and to protect the public good and private 
interests was not a direct democracy, but a republic, governed by represen-
tatives. He stated, 
　［…］as each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citi-
zens in the large than in the small republic, it will be more difficult for 
unworthy candidates to practice with success the vicious arts by which 
elections are too often carried; and the suffrages of the people being more 







merit and the most diffusive and established characters.（3）
　The same advantage which a republic had over democracy was enjoyed 
by a large over a small republic. In other words, a republic, in which repre-
sentatives were elected by the mass of the electorate, was superior to a 
democracy in which a small number of people debated each other directly, 
in terms of securing excellent human resources and inhibiting the tyranny 
of faction. Democracy, as opposed to a republic, was thought of as a system 
in which a subgroup of society sought to realize its own interests through 
public policy in the name of the public good by means of majority manipula-
tion. To paraphrase in the terminology of later political theory, it may cor-
respond to “interest-group pluralism” as described by Joseph Schumpeter 
and Robert Dahl, or to the “majority rule” which counts the aggregation of 
existing preferences as a public good.
Former republican position
　Contemporary republicans have tended to take over this Madisonian 
defense of a large republic and establish it as a political theory that over-
comes interest-group pluralism and the majoritarian rule. The former repub-
lican constitutionalists aimed to do so.
　Sunstein, for example, seeks to put emphasis on deliberation about the 
public good, as opposed to pluralism and the majoritarian rule. According to 
him, some theorists of public law has a “pluralist” view of the political life in 
modern society, in which a system of “aggregating citizen preferences” is 
used. But it faces the following difficulties. First, it produces unacceptable 
consequences, such as the subordination of certain social groups, as a result 
of indifference among the differences in private preferences of individuals 
and groups and of ignorance of the sources and effects of unjust preferences. 
Second, it is unable to present an accurate aggregation due to “cycling prob-
lems, strategic and manipulative behavior, sheer chance, and other factors” 
pointed out by public choice theory. The majoritarian rule is indifferent to 
the diversity or the strength of preferences. Third, it does not place a high 
value on political participation and fails to cultivate civic disposition neces-
⑶　Madison 1181.






sary to support political life, such as “self-development, feelings of empathy, 
social solidarity.” The pluralist view of politics is a generally accurate 
description of American public life today and is taken for granted by many 
theorists.（4）
　During the drafting of the U.S. Constitution, however, there was an alter-
native to pluralism that influenced the foundation of American public law. 
For Federalists like Madison, the primary task of representatives from 
states was not to deal and negotiate over particular interests of their con-
stituents but to deliberate over the public good. As Madison quoted above, 
representatives in Congress would be able to consider the common good for 
all American citizens by keeping a suitable distance from their constituents, 
rather than realizing their desires and interests as they were.（1） Deliberation 
has its advantages because it eliminates the unjust interests and preferences 
that voters might have. The preferences of each person or group are not 
exogenous to politics, but are a function of existing institutions and practices. 
They can be listed on the agenda in deliberation, subject to scrutiny and 
review, and if they are judged to be based on collective bias or prejudice, 
they will be eliminated as unjust preferences. The republican thought have 
several advantages over pluralism, besides deliberation: the notion of politi-
cal equality, which indicates that all individuals and groups should have 
access to the political process; a direction to universalism, which allows con-
sensus to be achieved through debate and dialogue; and the provision of an 
arena for citizenship to monitor the actions of representatives and to culti-
vate civic virtue. In addition to pluralism, this tradition of civic republican-
ism made an important effect on the Constitution during the drafting period, 
and the influence of this tradition must be taken into account now that the 
pluralist view of the Constitution has been dominant.（6） In this way, the for-
⑷　Sunstein 1988, pp.1142-41.
⑸　Sunstein 1981, pp.41-48. Sunstein, however, does not see the conflict between republi-
canism and pluralism as fundamental, for he states that “[t]he federalists thus achieved 
a kind of synthesis of republicanism and the emerging principles of pluralism.” [italic 
added by Omori] He also admits that the framer’s view of human beings, the institu-
tions, and rights it establishes was also a “hybrid” of pluralism and republicanism, and a 








mer republicans characterized their position.（1）
Later republican position 
　The later republican constitutionalists are not very different from the 
formers in defending a republican view of the Constitution in contrast to 
pluralism and the majority rule. Both of them can be said to be pointing in 
the same direction in trying to inherit Madisonian tradition. 
　Barnett defends what he calls “the Republican Constitution” in contrast to 
“the Democratic Constitution.” Although the name is “the Democratic 
Constitution,” it probably follows the “direct democracy” that Madison had 
disfavored and can be considered a constitutional view of pluralism and the 
majority rule in effect.（8） According to him, in the democratic conception of 
the Constitution, popular sovereignty is taken to mean government by the 
people as a collective body, i.e., government according to “the will of the 
people.” In effect, however, the will of the people is nothing but the will of 
the majority, so it must be understood as government according to the will 
of the majority of the people. To sum up this conception, he uses a sound 
bite “first comes government and then come rights.” It means that first there 
must be established a legislative authority to represent the will of the peo-
ple, and then the legislative body can decide which rights should get legal 
protection. Distinctive to this democratic conception of the Constitution is 
that it is seen as “the living constitution,” which is not bound by the dead of 
the past but is perverted to conform to the will of the majority of the people 
at any moment. On this conception, since judges are not elected by the 
majority, they should not actively exercise judicial review to invalidate stat-
⑺　Michelman also defends his republican theory of the Constitution in contrast to plu-
ralism. According to him, pluralists see politics as a means of maximizing preferences in 
the marketplace, but in his republican view of the Constitution, politics is seen as “juris-
generative,” imbuing a “sense of validity” as “our” law. Michelman 1988, pp.1101-11.
⑻　It is tempting to understand “republican” in his term “the Republican Constitution” to 
mean Republican Party, and “democratic” in “the Democratic Constitution” to mean 
Democrat.  Although in many passages he himself may actually mean it that way, he 
states that both views of the Constitution reflect the difference among the more funda-
mental worldviews that animate them. Barnett 2016, p.26. In this essay, I will under-
stand them as two currents that run through the history of constitutional politics, dis-
tinct from the two major parties in the United States.






utes as unconstitutional, but rather must defer to the elected representa-
tives, that is, the legislative branch.（9） This is the way to accurately aggre-
gate the desires and preferences of the majority of the people and to 
express the will of the people in the Constitution.
　In the republican conception of the Constitution, in contrast, popular sov-
ereignty is seen as consisting of the people as individuals, not as a collective 
unit. It is not the will of the people as a whole, but the equal protection of 
individual rights, that the Constitution is supposed to express. To sum up this 
conception, he uses another sound bite “first come rights and then comes 
government,” reversing the order of the two words in the previous one. That 
is to say, every person is endowed with inalienable natural rights, and then 
the government is established to ensure that these rights are guaranteed. 
The government has raison d'être insofar as it ensures that every person 
can enjoy his rights. What is the feature of the republican conception of the 
Constitution is that the meaning of the Constitution must be taken as it is 
until properly amended, i.e., interpreted according to its original intent. On 
this understanding, judges, like legislators, are the servants of the people, 
delegated their duties by the people, and are obligated to protect the 
Constitution and its rights from violations by the statute. If the legislative 
branch undermines the original intent of the Constitution, judges should not 
hesitate to exercise judicial review to invalidate the statute as unconstitu-
tional. That, he says, was the true intent of the framers, who were involved 
in the drafting of the Constitution. According to him, the democratic and 
republican conceptions of the Constitution are fundamentally incompatible 
because they have different worldviews which they assume under their con-
ceptions. And it is the republican conception, not the democratic, that cor-
rectly understands and animates the U.S. Constitution.（10）
　Thus, the republican constitutionalists, former and later, have defended 
their position in contrast to pluralism and the majority rule, although their 
terminology is somewhat different. So far, they have consistently shared the 
Madisonian interest in protecting the country by the Constitution from the 
tyranny of faction, and have tried to remain faithful to the tradition of 









embrace a different understanding of constitutional essentials - individual 
rights, self-government, and federalism - under the common name of “repub-
licanism.”
３． Individual rights―Institutional products to natural endowments
　As we have seen in the previous chapter, the former and the later republican 
constitutionalists have taken a similar position. But in effect they differ on 
some constitutional essentials. The topics taken up here are individual rights, 
their relationship to self-government, and federalism. They are not chosen 
arbitrarily but have a contextual significance. I explain at the beginning of 
each chapter.
　The first notion I address is “individual rights.” They are a focus of theo-
retical interest for modern republicans. In the republican tradition, which, as 
its original name suggests, was strongly oriented toward the public good or 
res publica. This notion was not necessarily compatible with the idea that 
every person could make legal demands to protect and realize his private 
interests. Therefore, the classical republicans, who sought to excavate the 
legacy of the ancient republic and pass it on to future generations, were 
concerned with how to take the modern conception of individual freedoms 
and rights in their tradition. Particularly, under the interpretation of the his-
tory that republicanism resurged in conflict with the thought of natural rights, 
a response to the notion of individual rights would be a central concern. It is 
no different for the former and the later republican constitutionalists.
Former republican view: Institutional products
　The former republican constitutionalists saw individual rights as institu-
tional products that were not pre-political but artificially prescribed. They 
were seen as a mechanism of legal protection that came to be granted for 
every person’s interests after the government had been established rather 
than as natural benefits that every person was endowed with at birth. 
　Sunstein, for example, insists that individual rights are adjusted and orga-
nized from the public viewpoint, not to protect existing private preferences 
as they are. According to him, private preferences should not be seen as 
pre-existing, pre-given, and fixed beyond the political process. They might 
have come about as a result of adaptation to one’s unfavorable environment 






or of being induced and manipulated by others with bad intentions. They are 
only a function of existing institutional practices, such as legal rules set by 
governments and customs. They can be critically examined in political delib-
eration from the diverse perspectives held by other participants and can be 
improved upon if they are assessed as prejudiced or unjust. They must be 
examined in terms of what is most beneficial to the community at large, 
rather than protecting existing private interests as they are. However, even 
if he emphasizes the public interest, it does not mean that he ignored or 
disregarded private interests, as classical republicans had done. Modern 
republicans support the right to freedom of expression and conscience, and 
never deny the protection of the autonomous sphere of individuals and 
groups from governmental regulation. In this sense, the republican concep-
tion of individual rights is not so different from the liberal one. However, he 
says,
［…］understandings that point to prepolitical or natural rights are 
entirely foreign to republicanism. On the republican point of view, the 
existence of realms of private autonomy must be justified in public terms.（11）
　For Sunstein, individual rights are problematic particularly when they are 
in conflict with economic equality. Among them, property rights are just 
legally constructed, and therefore there would be no problem in redistribut-
ing them if the exercise of the rights resulted in large disparities in the dis-
tribution of wealth and property among individuals or groups. Republicans 
should not hesitate to restrict the property rights of the advantaged in order 
to take policy measures to improve and enhance the economic position of the 
disadvantaged. That is exactly what Madison and the other framers of the 
U.S. Constitution were aiming for.（12） Certainly, some of the rights enshrined 
in the U.S. Constitution are better viewed as Lockean. Other rights, how-
ever, are more republican in color. Constitutional rights are ambivalent and 
hybrid,（13） so to speak. According to him, republicans stand upon a similar 










other constitutional institutions. In both cases, rights are not a pre-political 
given, but the product of political deliberation.（14） From this view, it can be 
pointed out that Lochner v. New York,（11） in which judges held that a state 
law restricting the labor hours of a baker was unconstitutional insofar as it 
violated freedom of contract, erred in interpreting property rights as natural 
and pre-political rights. In addition, Bowers v. Hardwick,（16） in which judges 
held that state laws regulating homosexual acts were constitutional, can also 
be criticized for its error in relying on the institutional fact that only hetero-
sexual marriages had been recognized, even though the marriage was just a 
legal construction.（11） Both were wrong in understanding individual rights as 
naturally given or taking the status quo as a fixed baseline, simply forgetting 
that they were institutional products.
Later republican view: Natural endowments
　The later republican constitutionalists, in contrast, have come to view 
individual rights as pre-political gifts rather than as artificial works. They 
are considered as natural rights that every person has at birth before the 
establishment of government, rather than legal protection of private inter-
ests approved in political deliberation as compatible with the public interest. 
Barnett’s slogan of the Republican Constitution, “first come rights, then 
comes government,” indicates that individual rights are innate to everyone 
as a pre-political given. They have been understood as such, according to 
him, throughout the history of the U.S. Constitution, and must be taken as 
such in our time.
　In the first place, individual rights carried weight in Thomas Jefferson’s 
draft of the Declaration of Independence, which preceded the U.S. Constitution. 
He referred to his draft of the Virginia Constitution and the draft in the hand 
of George Mason, the latter in particular, which clearly stated that “［…］ all 
men are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent natu-
ral rights.” In response, Jefferson drafted the famous sentence of the 
Declaration of Independence. He noted, “［w］e hold these truths to be self-
⒁　Sunstein 1988, pp.1161-69.
⒂　198 U.S. 41 （1901）
⒃　418 U.S. 186 （1986）
⒄　Sunstein 1988, pp.1119-80.






evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their 
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, ［...］ That to secure these rights, 
Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the 
consent of the governed.” If we read “consent of the governed” in the second 
sentence as “consent to the rule of the governors” and interpret it to mean 
that the governor-representatives can exercise “just power” as long as they 
get the consent of the governed, we can understand it to mean that the gov-
ernment cannot arbitrarily impose its will on the governed. Rather, as stated 
above in the second sentence, the government is supposed to ensure that all 
people are treated “equally” and enjoy “inalienable rights.”（18） According to 
Barnett, 
So, while the protection of natural rights or justice is the ultimate end of 
governance, particular governments only gain jurisdiction to achieve this 
end by the consent of those who are governed. In other words, the “con-
sent of the governed” tells us which government gets to undertake the 
mission of “securing” the natural rights that are retained by the people.（19）
　The U.S. Constitution has rooted in the spirit of the Republican Constitution 
found in the Declaration of Independence. While it has experienced a period 
of misinterpretation as the Democratic Constitution, it has maintained its 
lifeblood to our days, with the support of its exponents who have rightly 
interpreted it.
　What is distinctive in Barnett’s view of individual rights is that, unlike 
Sunstein, they are seen mainly to imply economic rights. It is evident in his 
passages where he appreciates the statements of anti-slavery advocates such 
as Salmon Chase, a lawyer who later served as governor of Ohio and chief 
justice of the Supreme Court. According to him, denouncements of slavery 
were focused on the idea of natural rights, especially of ownership, in which 
every person was both free to work and owned himself. Slavery was an eco-
nomic system set up in origin to deprive black slaves of their economic 
rights. The central concept of slavery was labor. Therefore, the 13th 
⒅　Barnett 2016, pp.31-44.







Amendment, which provided for the abolition of slavery, was thought by 
abolitionists to allow Congress to protect the economic freedom of slaves, 
which had been previously denied to them. Moreover, the context that led to 
the 14th Amendment, which established the privileges and immunities of 
U.S. citizens, also included a commitment to the natural right to economic 
freedom. One of the exponents of the amendment, Senator Jacob Howard, 
cited Supreme Court Justice Bushrod Washington’s opinion in Corfield v. 
Coryell,（20） in which he stated that liberties protected by the government are 
clearly exemplified as “the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to 
acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happi-
ness and safety.” Howard included among the Bill of Rights or a list of natu-
ral rights that the states could not infringe upon, the economic right “to 
make and enforce contracts” and “to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and 
convey real and personal property.”（21） If property rights were included as 
one of natural rights guaranteed in the Constitution, then the redistributive 
measures positively endorsed by the former republican constitutionalists 
would be disapproved as an infringement on property rights, i.e., a violation 
of natural rights. In this respect, we see a contrast between the former and 
the later republicans.
　Furthermore, Barnett argues that individual rights should be respected as 
a natural possession not just because they have a firm foothold in the history 
of the U.S. Constitution, but also because they are normatively just. According 
to him, the thought of natural law has been inherited with religious aspects, 
such as a belief in God, but natural rights are not necessarily so. The idea of 
natural rights asks not “how should we live?” but “how should society be 
organized so that every person can live and pursue happiness in contact 
with others?” It uses the “given-if-then” argument of natural law to identify 
the scope of freedom that every person can make his own choice. Ethics of 
natural law indicates how to exercise liberty within the sphere of freedom 
identified and guaranteed by natural rights, while the doctrine of natural 
rights only provides a framework for every person’s exercise of liberty with-
out telling him how to live or how to exercise it. The sound bite of the 
⒇　6 F. Cas. 146（1823）
㉑　Barnett 2016, pp.106-09.






Republican Constitution, “first come rights, then comes government,” is a 
modern translation of the natural rights philosophy and is no longer mysti-
cal.（22） It is different from a return to the past, a mere revival of natural law.
　Thus, the republican constitutionalists have shown this difference in their 
views of individual rights, and have changed their conception of them from 
institutional products to natural endowments. In the light of their predeces-
sors, it might be said that their conception of individual rights has shifted 
from a Madisonian-Lockean hybrid to purely Lockean. However, the differ-
ence among them is not limited to their views of individual rights. The shift 
has also changed their understanding of the relationship of individual rights 
to self-government, which was originally the focus of the republican tradi-
tion.
４． Self-government and rights: internal to hierarchial relationship
　For republicans, throughout their long history, the collective self-govern-
ment of the people has been ideal to be achieved. From Ancient Greece to 
the time of the drafting of the U.S. Constitution, it remained a consistent goal 
of republicanism that citizens should participate in the political arena, delib-
erate together, and decide on the common issues that concern themselves. 
But for modern republicans, the relationship of collective self-government to 
individual freedom was a stumbling block. For they were not able to deny 
possibilities of the conflict between them; the public decisions in a political 
community may violate the individual freedom to the body, property, and 
liberty, while the pursuit of the individual’s private interest may thwart the 
collective decision-making process - or a certain social group may satisfy its 
own interests through public power on the pretext of “common good.” 
Republicans have therefore devoted their theoretical attention to where the 
optimal equilibrium between them lies, and have managed to explain how 
they reconsider the end of self-government in relation to individual rights. 
Likewise, for the former and the later republican constitutionalists, the task 








Former republican view: Rights interrelated with self-government
　For the former republican constitutionalists, individual rights were regarded 
as interrelated with self-government, not as an independent goal. They were 
assumed, interpreted, and approved by citizens themselves through political 
deliberation. As we have seen in the previous chapter, they were grasped as 
institutional products from the self-governmental activities which were rec-
ognized by citizens themselves through political deliberation. But they can 
be seen in turn as playing a legal role in limiting political activity so that it 
does not run amok and operates properly. Without them, political delibera-
tion may not only fail to serve the public interest but also ignore or violate 
the private interests of every person. Individual rights can work, so to speak, 
not unilaterally, but in a bilateral manner with self-government.（23）
　Sunstein, for example, considers rights as both a result and an input of the 
deliberative process. The notion of self-government was, according to him, a 
center of republican concepts in the history of the U.S. Constitution. Madison 
and the other drafters approved citizenship and political participation to 
monitor the conduct of their representatives, and at the same time to foster 
civic disposition, with which citizens had an interest in the good of their 
community.（24） Their task was to avoid partisan conflict and to protect the 
public good of the community. That is why they supported a large republic. 
But besides, fundamental individual rights also play a central role. He states,
　Many rights are indispensable to democracy and to democratic delibera-
tion. If we protect such rights through the Constitution, we do not compro-
mise self-government at all. On the contrary, self-government depends for 
its existence on firmly protected democratic rights. Constitutionalism can 
thus guarantee the preconditions for democracy by limiting the power of 
㉓　Individual rights may be seen as acting as a constraint external to the political pro-
cess by the courts for the protection of structural minorities, or as an intrinsic con-
straint in the process of political deliberation, as an abstract principle subject to inter-
pretation. The former is John Ely’s （Ely 1980） understanding of rights, and the latter is 
republican’s, such as Habermas, Michelman, and Sunstein. The former republican con-
stitutionalists stand on the latter and are critical of Ely’s theory of judicial review, in 
which the role of the courts is viewed as opposed to political deliberation.
㉔　Sunstein 1988, pp.1111-61.






majorities to eliminate those preconditions.（21）
　Classical republicans have been denounced as being hostile to private 
interests because they require citizens to cultivate civic virtue and to par-
ticipate in deliberations for the common good. But that is misleading. Along 
with self-government, republicans have vindicated individual freedom from 
regulations by the public power of the state. According to him,
　Republican theories are not, however, hostile to the protection of indi-
vidual or group autonomy from state control. Indeed, legal rights have 
quite consistently accompanied republican systems. What is distinctive 
about the republican view is that it understands most rights as either the 
preconditions for or the outcome of an undistorted deliberative process.（26）
　Sunstein is not alone in recognizing the interrelationship between indi-
vidual rights and self-government. Generally, it is fair to say that this recog-
nition of the interrelationship, or more particularly a “circular relationship” 
between law and politics, was shared by the former republican constitution-
alists. Michelman also says that his “jurisgenerative” politics produces and 
crystallizes legal norms through a deliberative process, while it is limited by 
a legal framework, which is itself the product of the process in turn. 
American constitutionalism, according to him, was based on two assump-
tions about political freedom. One is freedom of self-government, in which 
people determine for themselves the norms that govern themselves. The 
other is freedom under the rule of law, in which people protect themselves 
from the arbitrary use of public power. These two are often considered as 
contradictory, but in practice, they prove to be “amounting to the same 
thing.” These must be seen as integrated; the role of politics as law-making 
and the role of law as correcting the distortions of politics. Law in the gov-
ernment of laws formula “must stand in a circular relation with politics as 
both outcome and input, both product and prior condition.”（21）
㉕　Sunstein 1993, p.142.
㉖　Sunstein 1988, pp.1111.







　Thus, the former republican constitutionalists, despite some differences in 
terminology, shared a view of individual rights as being closely interrelated 
to self-government.（28）
Later republican view: Rights superior to self-government 
　The later republican constitutionalists, in contrast, view individual rights 
not as interrelated with self-government, but as a more important value than 
self-government. Although self-government has remained one of the central 
values in the republican tradition, the political goal to be achieved has now 
become the guarantee of individual rights to body, property, and freedom, 
which is independent of the deliberative process.
　Barnett assumes that individual rights enshrined in the Republican 
Constitution since it was drafted have occupied a dominant position indepen-
dent of the legislature, an arena of self-governmental activities. For him, the 
guarantee of individual rights is left to the courts, while the self-governmen-
tal activities are equated with the exercise of sovereignty by the people, 
united as one, in the legislature. With this understanding, he accuses the 
exponents of the Democratic Constitution of having repeatedly insisted 
throughout the history of the U.S. Constitution that the courts should defer 
to Congress and, in the end, of abandoning the guarantee of rights by the 
courts as the guardians of the law in favor of people’s sovereignty, or the 
majoritarian rule. Such judicial deference on the democratic view of the 
Constitution virtually watered down the republican amendments to the 
Constitution. In infamous Plessy v. Ferguson,（29） for example, Justice Henry 
Brown held that “［a］ statute which implies merely a legal distinction 
between the white and colored races has no tendency to destroy the legal 
equality of the two races,” and that because the legislative majority had 
㉘　Furthermore, Jürgen Habermas, although not often called a republican, also shares an 
understanding with Michelman and others. His theory of the “logical genesis of rights” 
refers to the circular relationship between law and politics and is inspired by 
Michelman’s theory of jurisgenerative politics. See, Habermas 1992. S.113-11（pp.120-
22）. Once I pointed out the recognitions common to the exponents of participating-
deliberation version of republicanism （Omori 2019, pp.48-11） and relied on them to 
construct a republican theory of law. Cf. Omori 2006, pp.119-231（though not written in 
English）.
㉙　163 U.S. 131 （1896）






ordered a separation, “there must necessarily be a large discretion on the 
part of the legislature.” But this represents judicial deference to the will of 
the majority at the core of the Democratic Constitution, an omission that 
overlooks the evils of slavery and infringes on the fundamental freedom of 
the black minority. This ruling has resulted in another 10 years of black 
minority servitude.（30）
　Since then, Barnett scolds, the U.S. Supreme Court continued to undermine 
the republican view by upholding the democratic view of the Constitution. 
The leading figures were James Bradley Thayer, a professor at Harvard 
Law School, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., a Supreme Court Justice and Lewis, 
Louis Dembitz Brandeis, a Harvard Law School professor and Supreme Court 
Justice, and other progressive legal scholars and judges. Professor Thayer, 
to his dismay, established the standard for presuming the constitutionality of 
a statute that judges “can only disregard” a statute “when those who have 
the right to make laws have not merely made a mistake, but have made a 
very clear one ― so clear that it is not an open to rational question” and has 
upheld erroneous and unjust statutes that do not meet this standard as con-
stitutional. Plessy v. Ferguson was the embodiment of this Thayerian defer-
ence approach. Justice Holmes, in his famous dissent in the Lochner v. New 
York, followed this deference approach, holding that if a reasonable and 
impartial person would consider a statute as constitutional, it is, in fact, so.（31） 
Moreover, Justice Brandeis did not strike down the insurance regulation in 
the case of O’Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.（32） by stating 
that “the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some 
factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute.”（33） According to 
Barnett, this era, though it would be replaced by a partial revival of the 
Republican Constitution during the New Deal, was a dark period in which 
progressive exponents of the Democratic Constitution prevailed. The courts 
㉚　Barnett 2016, pp.119-23.
㉛　Barnett 2016, pp.121-30. Barnett also accuses Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and 
Woodrow Wilson of supporting the Democratic Constitution that indicates a deference 
to the legislative branch. Ibid., pp.130-31.








did not play a role in guaranteeing individual rights, for they supported the 
self-governmental activities of the legislature by inaction.
　 The U.S. Supreme Court, according to Barnett, gradually abandoned the 
deference approach on the democratic view of the Constitution and entered an 
era of the Republican Constitution. In the United States v. Carotene Products,（34） 
it upheld the rationality of the state law that banned the interstate sale of 
filled milk as a means of protecting public health. However, in the footnote, it 
left room for a narrow interpretation of constitutionality in the case, opening 
up the possibility of making exceptions, such as “the abuse of the rights of a 
minority by those in the majority”.（31） Then Brown v. Board of Education（36） 
was the crowning achievement of the Republican Constitution. Needless to 
say, the federal court ruled that racial segregation measures in schools vio-
lated the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides for the equal protection 
of the laws. It was a reversal of the Court’s attitude, which in Plessy had 
given deference to the legislature on the democratic view of the Constitution. 
The decision ignited a lot of controversy at the time, but the most well-known 
argument is Alexander Bickel’s “counter-majoritarian difficulty.” He argued 
that there is a fundamental difficulty for unelected judges to strike down as 
unconstitutional statutes enacted by elected officials. According to Barnett, 
Bickel’s argument can be understood as being based on the democratic view 
of the Constitution. He ironically reverses Bickel’s formulation saying that 
the problem lies not in the “anti-majoritarian difficulty” but the “majoritarian 
difficulty.” He notes,
［…］we can label the problem with democratic republicanism as the 
“majoritarian difficulty”: as Madison observed, where the greatest power 
resides lies the greatest danger to the rights of the people. In a republic, 
that power resides in a majority of the electorate. An independent judiciary 
with a duty to protect these rights from being unreasonably restricted by 
the majority is part of the answer to this majoritarian difficulty.（31）
㉞　304 U.S. 144 （1938）
㉟　Barnett 2016, pp.113-18.
㊱　341 U.S. 483 （1914）
㊲　Barnett 2016, p.162.






　Thus, for the later republican constitutionalists, deference to the legisla-
ture, an arena for self-governmental activities, is dismissed as contrary to the 
proper interpretation of the Constitution. On the contrary, what they recom-
mend on the proper interpretation is that when a statute enacted by a con-
gressional majority infringes on the rights of structural minorities, the inde-
pendent judiciary must declare it unconstitutional. There is no division of 
roles or cooperation between the self-governmental activities of Congress 
and the rights guarantees of the Courts; there is only a disconnect. 
Individual rights are distinguished from and placed above self-government.
　As we have seen, it is fair to say that the republican constitutionalists differ 
in their understanding of the relationship between self-government and indi-
vidual rights. They have come to see these two as a hierarchical relation-
ship, rather than a mutual relationship, among separate values. They have 
been beyond reconciling a modern invention with an ancient ideal, to affirm-
ing the superiority of individual rights over self-government. But their tran-
sition is not seen only in their theoretical interpretations of individual rights 
and self-government. They have significantly changed even the understand-
ing of the structure of national government assumed by the U.S. 
Constitution.
５．Federalism―Local self-government to individual choice
　For the republicans, how to design a federal system has been one of the 
greatest concerns when they tackled with drafting the Constitution. 
Borrowing bits of the republican thought, both federalists and anti-federalists 
argued about how to allocate state and federal powers before the political 
system of the United States had been established. Given this historical back-
ground, it is not surprising that the recent republican constitutionalists are 
still much interested in federalism. As we have seen in the previous chapter, 
the former republican constitutionalists regarded individual rights as inter-
related with self-government, while the later republicans viewed rights as 
superior to self-government. Along with how to see the relationship between 
these two, both of them perceive federalism characteristically in their 
respective ways. The issue of federalism, so to speak, seems to be the light 







later republican constitutionalists. In what follows, I will try to highlight the 
difference between their views of federalism.
Former republican view: An arena of self-government
　For the former republican constitutionalists, federalism was highly 
regarded as an institutional mechanism that allows for local self-govern-
ment. They appraised it as a federation of subordinate political units that can 
prevent centralization of political power, encourage participation in small 
communities, and foster civic disposition.
　Sunstein, for example, assesses that federalism serves the negative function 
of preventing the concentration of power in government that restricts the 
realization of self-government. The U.S. Constitution, according to him, 
provides various institutional measures to prevent the concentration of power. 
Along with the separation of powers and bicameralism, the federal system 
is also designed to function as a restraint and balance among subordinate 
political units.（38） These constitutional complexes of mutual restraint are nec-
essary to prevent the various social factions from abusing public power in 
pursuit of their peculiar interests. It would work as one of the bulwarks 
against the concentration of power.（39） Also, if the governments are mutually 
vigilant in preventing the concentration of power in the hands of the federal 
government or any particular state, the citizens of the United States will not 
afraid of the arbitrary interference of public authorities. The leading repub-
lican political theorist Philip Pettit, though he differs from Sunstein and oth-
ers in his view of republican liberty,（40） also praises federalism in a similar 
context. According to him, it can limit the arbitrary interference of those in 
power and protect the “liberty as non-domination” of citizens by widely dis-
persing power in the same way that the separation of powers and bicamer-
alism have worked.（41） To achieve republican liberty, it is necessary to avoid 
㊳　Sunstein 1988, pp.1161-62.
㊴　Sunstein 1981, p.44.
㊵　Pettit views political freedom as “non-domination,” in which the arbitrary and poten-
tial interference of those in power is limited by legal rules, while Sunstein regards it as 
“self-government,” as we have seen. I have once discussed the distinction of their views 
of freedom, by grouping the neo-Athenian republicans―including Sunstein, Michelman,
　and Sandel－and the neo-Roman―including Pettit, Skinner, and Viroli. See, Omori 2019.
㊶　Pettit 1991, pp.111-19.






coercion from above through centralization, which interferes with the free 
collective decision-making of citizens.
　Besides, federalism is significant for self-government because it facilitates 
the decision-making of citizens in small political units. Although Madison and 
other federalists favored large republics because small communities were 
more prone to the tyranny of factions, there is no doubt that self-government, 
as republicans have traditionally affirmed, is more likely to be promoted in 
local, face-to-face communities than in large polities at a national level. Their 
task was how to hybridize a large republic that would prevent the tyranny 
of factions on the one hand, with small communities that would allow for 
self-government on the other. The federal system would provide the best 
blend between those two demands. As Sunstein puts it,
　At the same time, the federal system would guarantee an arena for citi-
zen self-determination and promote diversity and responsiveness. The 
considerable role for the states provided a locus in which to satisfy the 
traditional republican belief in small republics. To be sure, much of feder-
alist thought was based on a rejection of the traditional republican belief 
in local democracies; but the Constitution that emerged furnished a secure 
place for self-determination through the federal system, supplementing 
and complementing national institutions.（42）
　This allowance of room for state-level self-government within the federal 
framework has remained a precious experience in the history of the U.S. 
Constitution. One of the advantages that the original constitutional system 
had was “its simultaneous provision of deliberative representation at the 
national level and self-determination at the local level, furnishing a sphere for 
traditional republican goals.” As Alexis de Tocqueville emphasized, a central 
republican lesson was “the need to provide outlets for self-determination in 
the public and private.”（43）The republican notion of self-government can per-
meate society across the public and private spheres through the two- or 









　Moreover, for the former republicans, federalism was appraised as a way 
to encourage citizens to participate in politics and to culminate their civic 
disposition in order to achieve the end of self-government. Among them, 
Micheal Sandel, who is often mentioned as a communitarian political theorist, 
argues that the federal system plays a central role in character building by 
clarifying the original significance of federalism. He argues that it is difficult 
for modern sovereign states to raise civic consciousness in people, but we 
cannot expect cosmopolitanism as an alternative to it, which advocates love 
for universal humanity in a global-scale society. Rather, federalism in the 
original sense of the word, which relies on smaller communities than states, 
is a more promising option. In other words, it “suggests that self-government 
works best when sovereignty is dispersed and citizenship formed across 
multiple sites of civic engagement.” For example, Tocqueville focused on 
townships, and Thomas Jefferson proposed dividing the countries into wards, 
local units of self-government which could make participation and virtue 
cultivation easy. The political insights behind them have not lost their sig-
nificance today: “the insight that proliferating sites of civic activity and 
political power can serve self-government by cultivating virtue, equipping 
citizens for self-rule, and generating loyalties to larger political wholes.”（44） 
They believe that the civic virtues essential for self-government can only be 
cultivated through the small communities on which original federalism rests.
　Thus, the former republican constitutionalists highly regarded the federal 
system as an essential constitutional institution designed for self-government 
by restricting the concentration of power and promoting political participa-
tion and civic virtue.
Later-republican view: Protection of individual choice
　For the later republican constitutionalists, in contrast, the federal system 
is seen not as a mechanism for self-government but as one for protecting 
individual rights. It allows for diverse social experimentation and competition 
at the state level, thereby broadening the range of options and allowing indi-
viduals to choose the state to which they belong.
　Barnett asserts that federalism is a system that gives every person the 
㊹　Sandel 1996, pp.338-48.






freedom to choose where to belong by presenting residence options at the 
state level rather than the national level. The U.S. Constitution gives the 
federal government only limited powers over trade with foreign countries 
and among the states, etc., while reserving other powers to the states. It 
added a few more amendments, but “the resulting system of federalism has 
yielded some enormous advantages for protecting the rights retained by the 
people.” It means that the enactment of most statutes affecting the liberty of 
the people is now in the hands of the state legislatures, not of the federal 
legislature. This was confirmed by Justice John Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden.（41） 
He said that the power of the states is “that immense mass of legislation 
which embraces everything within the territory of a State not surrendered 
to the General Government.”（46）
　This understanding of federalism means to have opened the way for vari-
ous social experiments with laws by state legislatures. It allows the 10 states 
to experiment with different laws and regulations, and to judge their results 
of what they have done. Of course, the experiment may have some good and 
some bad results. If the result is good, it will become common knowledge of 
the whole nation that the other states can imitate and use later. Even if a 
bad result occurs, the effect will be limited to that state and its people. This 
is not the case if the experiment is conducted at the national level. If the 
result is good, it will be surely good for every citizen. But that’s 
a matter of luck. If it is unlucky and unsuccessful, the damage will be far 
more enormous. The damage would be nationwide, including all the states 
and their people, and it would take a long time to recover all. It is better to 
keep social experiments at the local level to increase social plasticity and 
flexibility. Justice Brandeis, in his opinion of New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,（41） 
rightly called the states “laboratories of experimentation,” even though he 
was wrong when he wrote his dissent in the direction of restricting people’s 
rights. His word itself is still valid. The variety of laws and regulations 
allows the states to find the best solution through trial and error. Federalism 
allows for a “marketplace of ideas” among the states, so to speak, and helps 
㊺　22 U.S. 1, 203 （1824）
㊻　Barnett 2016, pp.111-13.







in the discovery of truth.
　The reason why state experiments under the federal system are desirable 
is that, in addition to the merits of experimentation in itself and of truth dis-
covery, it is also beneficial to individual freedom. By making every state 
distinctive, it gives every person the freedom to choose the place of belonging 
that is most convenient to his conception of the good life. From the citizens’ 
viewpoint, state experiments also mean a competition among states to 
attract and retain residents. States that provide better services for individual 
freedom will gain more residents, while those that do not will lose them. 
Competition among states would give citizens more options by encouraging 
states to develop better living environments within their territories. Although 
competition among smaller administrative districts such as counties or cities 
may offer more variety, the Constitution has chosen the states to be the 
governmental units. If a policy is determined at the national level, there is 
only one policy, and citizens have no choice. In the case of the U.S., there are 
two major political parties, so at best, they only have the choice of voting for 
Republican or Democrat candidates. For there are large differences in prefer-
ences among individuals regarding social policy, it is better to provide as 
many options as possible.（48） Because
　from the perspective of diversity, it is preferable to have the variety of 
options provided by fifty state governments than a one-size-fits-all national 
policy［..］it is far more likely that a person can find a state or municipality 
with a social environment in which he or she is more comfortable［..］it is 
best to have as many different communities as possible from which to 
choose to satisfy the range of individual tastes, preferences, and moral 
commitments［..］In all these ways, liberty is more robustly protected by 
confining lawmaking to the state and local levels in a federal system, than 
by moving all such decisions to the national level.（49）
　As long as citizens have freedom of interstate movement, they can decide 
in which state to live by comparing social policies of states in the viewpoint 
㊽　Barnett 2016, pp.116-18.
㊾　Barnett 2016, pp.118-80.






of their conception of the good life. Such freedom of choice is not possible 
when a nation imposes a single policy on all citizens. Surely, it could be pos-
sible to choose a more favorable nation, but this would impose a huge burden 
of changing cultural habits, such as learning a new language or keeping up 
with the neighbors in the host country. This would not be a realistic option. 
Allowing choice among nations would also reproduce what Thomas Hobbes 
called “the war of all against all.” If every nation adopts only one religion and 
restricts the beliefs of citizens within its territory, it will bring about another 
disastrous religious war. Classical liberalism sought to avert such a catastro-
phe by giving all individuals freedom of religious choice and conscience. 
Serious matters, which affect everyone’s life like the adoption of religion, 
should not be left to the nation but should be individualized as much as pos-
sible. These individual freedoms are much better protected at the local level 
than at the national level. In this way, the later republican constitutionalists 
regard federalism as a system that protects individual right to free choice, 
independent of self-government.
　Thus, the republican constitutionalists have a different views of federal-
ism and have come to see it as a guarantee of individual choice rather than 
an arena for the realization of self-government. Republicans might be said to 
have changed the view of federalism to the extent which it is more suited to 
the modern notion of individual rights than to the ancient ideal of self-gov-
ernment.
　So far, I have reviewed the theoretical changes in republican constitution-
alism, focusing on individual rights, their relationship to self-government, and 
federalism. Although I cannot go into the details here, I would like to make 
some comments on the implications of these theoretical changes.
６．Some considerations
　As we have seen, the republican constitutionalists, while agreeing on their 
position in contrast to pluralism, differ greatly in their views of individual 
rights, their relationship to self-government, and federalism. From the per-
spective of the history of thought, republican constitutionalism can be described 







Madisonian and Lockean hybrid to the purely Lockean form. More generally, 
republicanism may be said to have transformed from a version that recon-
ciled classical republicanism with modern liberalism to one closer to liber-
tarianism, more right-leaning liberalism. In this last chapter, though I cannot 
make a comprehensive inquiry into this recent shift of republicanism, 
I would like to briefly review three implications of the shift: historical fidel-
ity, recognition of the division of institutional roles, and prospects as an alter-
native.
Less faithful to the republican tradition?
　First, on historical fidelity. The republican constitutionalists, insofar as 
they proclaim themselves to be “republicans,” somehow inherit the lineage 
of classical republicanism that has continued since ancient times. The former 
republican constitutionalists have been relatively faithful to the republican 
tradition in this respect. Sunstein, for example, explicitly embraces the legacy 
of Aristotle and James Harrington, considering the belief in deliberation, one 
of the republican tenets, as widespread in the United States.（10） However, 
traditional republicanism, with its exclusion and discrimination of the working 
class, foreigners, and women, its militarism and hero-worship, its celebration 
of the common good, and disdain for the private interests, has made few 
laudable claims.（11） Classical republicanism, if it is still attractive to revive, 
must be stripped of these outdated and immoral elements and reworked to 
fit the modern context. It is in this context that he goes beyond a mere 
revival of republicanism and manages to defend “liberal” republicanism. He 
argues that “［s］ome elements of the liberal tradition are highly congenial to 
republican conceptions of politics,” such as its emphasis on deliberation, 
political equality, and citizenship; the fact that it does not view private inter-
ests and rights as pre-political, but allows them to be subject to critical 
examination in deliberation; and its belief in neutrality and universality. 
“［I］n numerous respects republicanism and liberalism are hardly antonyms. 
Republican thought, understood in a certain way, is a prominent aspect of the 










constitutionalists took over the ideas of classical republicanism was ambiva-
lent, but they tried to be faithful to them, at least insofar as they were com-
patible with modern liberalism.
　The later republican constitutionalist, in contrast, seems not to have 
inherited the ideas of classical republicanism but goes even beyond being 
reconciled to liberalism to radicalize it. Barnett certainly tries to interpret 
the U.S. Constitution as strongly influenced by Jefferson, Madison, and other 
republican drafters. However, he is also trying to highlight the history of the 
U.S. Constitution by arguing that its various elements can be traced back to 
the Lockean ideas,（13） and that what it tried to protect consistently in its his-
tory was natural rights, not self-government.（14） His understanding of feder-
alism as allowing room for individual choice is one of the expressions of his 
view of constitutional history. Besides, his slogan of the Republican 
Constitution, “first come rights and then comes government,” symbolizes 
that his view is rooted in the thought of natural rights. In particular, he 
interpreted the 13th Amendment, which prescribes the abolition of slavery, 
as prohibiting the deprivation of economic rights of slaves. His theory of 
constitutional interpretation intended to bring Lockean liberalism or radical 
libertarianism to the fore. It seems to separate the Constitution from the 
influence of classical republicanism.
　However, can we say that this new interpretation of constitutional law, 
which emphasizes only Lockean influences, is faithful to the tradition of 
republicanism? Not very likely. It is because original republican thought is 
often traced back to ancient Greece or the Roman republic and has been 
regarded as a separate strand of thought from that of natural rights. For 
example, John Pocock, a representative scholar of civic humanism, has tried 
to highlight the republican thought influenced by Aristotle and Machiavelli 
as a different lineage from the Lockean thought, which people have widely 
accepted as political thought in America. According to him,
　The insistent claim that the American is a natural man and America 
founded on the principles of nature is enough to demonstrate that, and the 
　Barnett 2016, p.201.







pursuit of nature and its disappointments can readily be expressed in the 
rhetoric of virtue and corruption; for this is the rhetoric of citizenship, and 
a cardinal assertion of Western thought has been that man is naturally a 
citizen - kata phusin zo－on politikon. However, American social thought has 
long employed a paradigm, supposedly Locke’s, of government emerging 
from and highly continuous with a state of natural sociability; and it has 
been seriously contended that no other paradigm than Locke’s has thriven 
or could have thriven in the unique conditions of American society. In this 
book we have been concerned with another tradition, reducible to the 
sequence of Aristotle’s thesis that human nature is civic and Machiavelli’s 
thesis that, in the world of secular time where alone the polis can exist, 
this nature of man may never be more than partially and contradictorily 
realized. Virtue can develop only in time, but is always threatened with 
corruption by time. In the special form taken when time and change were 
identified with commerce, this tradition has been found to have been 
operative over wide areas of thought in the eighteenth century, and to 
have provided a powerful impulse to the American Revolution.（11）
　The conventional wisdom among scholars who have studied their growth 
has been that the Puritan covenant was reborn in the Lockean contract, 
so that Locke himself has been elevated to the station of a patron saint of 
American values and the quarrel with history has been seen in terms of a 
constant attempt to escape into the wilderness and repeat a Lockean 
experiment in the foundation of a natural society. The interpretation put 
forward here stresses Machiavelli at the expense of Locke; it suggests that 
the republic - a concept derived from Renaissance humanism - was the 
true heir of the covenant and the dread of corruption the true heir of the 
jeremiad. It suggests that the foundation of independent America was 
seen, and stated, as taking place at a Machiavellian-even a Rousseauan-
moment, at which the fragility of the experiment, and the ambiguity of the 
republic’s position in secular time, was more vividly appreciated than it 
could have been from a Lockean perspective.（16）
　Pocock 1911, p.121 （emphasis added by Omori）.
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　Maurizio Viroli, a renowned scholar of the history of republican thought, 
also emphasizes that the thought of natural rights is an inherent feature of 
liberalism and is different from the ideas of Machiavelli and other republi-
cans. He states,
　A distinctive feature of liberalism that is completely absent from early-
modern Italian republicanism, however, is the theory of the natural （or 
inalienable, or innate） rights of man. This doctrine is fundamental, but it 
suffers from the obvious theoretical weakness that rights are （more or less） 
respected only when sustained by laws and customs. Rights are thus his-
torical, not natural, and when they are not sustained by laws and customs, 
they are not rights but moral claims - noble, decent, and reasonable, but 
only claims. It is for this reason that Machiavelli, wiser than later theorists, 
had no use for the idea of natural rights and spoke only of liberty as a good 
that individuals may enjoy if they have good political and military institu-
tions, if they possess a sufficient degree of civic virtue［..］.（11）
　Thus, republicanism has been understood as a separate strand from the 
thought of natural rights. The republican constitutionalists, however, seem 
to have gradually considered the Constitution in terms of purely Lockean 
natural rights and have been moving away from the traditional ideas of clas-
sical republicanism. The former republican constitutionalists such as 
Sunstein, who advocated the reconciliation of republicanism to liberalism, 
might have already begun to break away from the republican tradition. But 
Barnett and other libertarians made this breakaway definitive. In particular, 
the classical republicans tended to be hostile to wealth, commerce, and 
extravagance and never understood economic interests as protected by 
natural rights. The Lockean understanding of property ownership as indi-
vidual rights seems to be pouring something different into the ancient tradi-
tion - pouring new wine into old leather bags. To call oneself a “republican” 
and yet espouse a different thought is not only self-deceptive but under-
mines the brand – if any - of republicanism.







Judicial activism undermining self-government?
　Fidelity to republican tradition may be a concern only for historians of 
political thought. But the role of the courts is another matter. It is because it 
is directly related to what principle the courts should adopt in resolving the 
case at hand. The republican constitutionalists, who are interested in consti-
tutional cases as well, have a certain position about the role of the courts. 
Their view of the judiciary role seems to have shifted toward a lack of 
respect for political deliberation and self-governmental activities in the legis-
lative branch, along with the Lockean tendency described above. Let us look 
at this transition below.
　The former republican constitutionalists seem to have in origin viewed the 
judiciary role as somewhat limited. In particular, they were not so ready to 
allow the courts to review the constitutionality of statutes respecting the 
political deliberation in the legislature. It was because they emphasized the 
political deliberation as a core element of republicanism and envisioned the 
legislative branch as the primary forum for self-governmental activities.（18）
　Sunstein, for example, whose position itself has changed and become unclear, 
at least in the beginning when he was advocating republican constitutional-
ism,（19） took the position of “judicial minimalism” as a theory of constitutional 
interpretation.（60） Judicial minimalism, though I leave the details to him,（61） is 
　However, this was not the common recognition of the judiciary role shared by all the 
republican constitutionalists. Michelman, for example, thought that the forum for delib-
eration was the courts, not the legislature. He poked fun at Ronald Dworkin’s discussion 
of Hercules, an ideal judge who would be able to solve every case on principle by him-
self, and argued that the plurality of justices on the Supreme Court – dialogue in court 
- was “an aspect of judicial self-government.” Michelman 1986, pp.13-11.
　In the late 1980s, when he was advocating republican constitutionalism, Sunstein 
criticized the policies during the New Deal period but believed that it was not the judi-
ciary but rather the regulatory administration, that was deviating from the separation 
of powers and disrupting the division of roles among branches. “The New Deal actors 
were far too cavalier in their treatment of the problem. National institutions are at best 
an imperfect arena for obtaining self-determination by the citizenry, and federal control 
are often excessively rigid and inefficient. The presidency itself, although visible, hardly 
a forum for republican self-government.” Sunstein 1981, p.101.
　The relationship between republican constitutionalism and judicial minimalism is 
unclear in Sunstein’s own mind, partly because of the discrepancy in the timing of the 
publication of these views. I have participated in a symposium with him and commented 
on his keynote lecture, but was unable to ask in-depth questions on this point.






roughly described as follows. It is a theory of constitutional interpretation 
that requires judges to interpret the Constitution for a “narrow” range of 
cases and to make decisions based on “shallow” reasons. When a decision 
must be “narrow,” it means that the judge will focus only on the case at hand 
before the court and will not make a broad decision that will affect other 
cases or establish a general rule that would resolve all cases. When a deci-
sion must be “shallow,” it means that judges should base their rulings on 
“incompletely theorized agreement” on contested constitutional issues, not 
touching on deep political or religious commitments that cause irreconcilable 
conflict among people. The point of this theory is to ensure that the court 
should allow room for political deliberation by limiting its own role. “There 
is a relationship between judicial minimalism and democratic deliberation. Of 
course minimalist rulings increase the space for further reflection and debate 
at the local, state, and national levels, simply because they do not foreclose 
subsequent decisions.”（62） The judges must remain silent and leave the solu-
tion open for later discussion, which will take place outside the court, rather 
than stepping in and disturbing the discussion. “Cautious judges can promote 
democratic deliberation with more minimalist strategies, designed to bracket 
some of the deeper questions but also to ensure both accountability and 
reflection. Many minimalist decisions attempt to ensure more in the way of 
democracy and more in the way of deliberation.”（63） The court itself must not 
be a forum for deliberation but must adhere to certain principles in order to 
keep deliberation open in other branches. “The basic principles of justiciabil-
ity are designed to limit the occasions for judicial interference with political 
processes. These principles - involving mootness, ripeness, reviewability, and 
standing - say that judges can intervene only at certain times and at the 
behest of certain people. In this way the principles are obviously an effort to 
minimize the judicial presence in American public life.”（64） His theory of con-
stitutional interpretation at this point seems to have implied an attitude of 
judicial deference and the possibility of leaving broad opportunities for self-










government in the legislature.
　However, Sunstein later modified his position on judicial minimalism to 
emphasize that he was not a defender of judicial deference. According to 
him, judicial minimalism is not a general canon that should be applied to all 
constitutional cases, but rather a situational standard that may be or may 
not be applied to some cases. As Justice O’Connor stated, “［n］one of this 
means that minimalism is always appropriate in constitutional cases. When 
the area requires a high degree of predictability, and when the Court has 
had a great deal of experience with the area, width might well be justified. 
The same conclusion follows if the Court, notwithstanding its lack of experi-
ence, has good reason for confidence in a wide ruling. The only point is that 
in many frontiers cases, the very arguments that justify standards will jus-
tify minimalism as well.”（61） Judicial minimalism is now reduced to one of the 
first-order positions, and whether to adopt minimalism is considered to be 
the second-order meta-judgment. He calls the second-order position “perfec-
tionism.” From its perspective, minimalism must be adopted only when the 
court deems it appropriate to render a narrow and shallow judgment. In 
other cases, it may be better for other first-order standards, such as origi-
nalism or Thayerism, to be adopted.（66） It all depends on the case, i.e. case by 
case. The point of this post-minimalism is that it partially acknowledges that 
judges may, in some cases, challenge and interfere with political deliberations 
in the legislature. “But where there is no problem from the standpoint of self-
government, and no unjustifiable inequality, I believe that judges should usu-
ally give democratic processes the benefit of the reasonable doubt.”（61） This 
seems to admit that the courts are only a few steps away from their bound-
aries in front of the legislative branch. This idea almost seems to concede 





　In this regard, I asked him a question in my comments at the symposium mentioned 
above. My question was whether his minimalist interpretive strategy could make the 
division of roles between the judiciary and the legislature work. See Omori 2012. As I 
remember, his reply at that moment was “you are right that minimalism doesn’t work, 
and if I add to your opinion... ,” but his reply published later was as simple as the following.






　The later republican seems to have further strengthened the tendency to 
transcend judicial minimalism. Barnett welcomes the judicial review of stat-
utes and urges the protection of individual rights by the courts. In his view, 
the Supreme Court has been too deferential and has failed to fulfill its proper 
role of guaranteeing individual rights. According to him, advocates of the 
Democratic Constitution such as Thayer, Roosevelt, Holmes, and Brandeis 
have consistently preached judicial deference to other branches since the 
New Deal. In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc.,（69） the Supreme Court held that a federal court must defer to the legal 
interpretation made by those government agencies, the Environmental 
Protection Agency’s interpretation of a provision of the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1911.（10） In Williams v. EPA, Inc. In Williamson v. Lee 
Optical,（11） the Supreme Court also held Oklahoma’s law preventing Lee 
Optical from selling eyeglasses at low prices to be constitutional and 
adopted an extreme deference standard.（12） And many others. “Obtaining the 
benefits of federalism requires federal courts to develop doctrines that iden-
tify the outer limits of Congress’s enumerated powers, as the Supreme 
　　It is important to see that minimalists do not necessarily defer to the democratic 
process; they do not adopt a strong presumption in favor of whatever the legislature 
decides. Those who believe in a consistent policy of judicial restraint, or who favor 
respect for whatever legislatures do, are not minimalists in the sense that I under-
stand them here. Consider in this regard the remarks of Hidetomi Omori, who per-
haps misunderstands me on this point[..]. Minimalists are willing to strike down the 
outcomes of legislative processes. The key point is that when they do so, they seek to 
rule narrowly and shallowly. Sunstein 2012, p.93.
　　I understood his reply to mean that there is a difference in dimension between a 
court’s decision to invalidate statutes on the one hand, and the scope and reasons for 
that decision on the other. However, I have seen many criticisms that the minimalism is 
a defense of judicial negativism, and I cannot shake the impression that the strategy of 
minimizing the breadth of the subject matter and the depth of the reasons may weaken 
the power of the judiciary to invalidate a large amount of statutes, at least empirically, 
if not theoretically. In any way, the partial abandonment of judicial minimalism seems to 
imply a shift from judicial deference to the active judiciary - and thus interference in the 
legislative process.
　461 U.S. 831 （1984）
　Barnett 2016, pp.211-18.








Court was attempting, however imperfectly, to do before 1931, and has tep-
idly done since 1991. And the Court must overcome its reluctance to enforce 
the separation of powers within the federal government［..］.”（13）
　 The purpose of the judiciary interference in other branches, as set forth 
by Barnett, is not to achieve self-government or promote political deliberation, 
but rather to guarantee individual rights. Judges need to determine whether 
a statute that may infringe on individual rights is within the power of Congress 
or state legislatures in light of the due process of law provided by the 14th 
Amendment. If the statute deems outside the scope of congressional power 
and unduly infringes on personal rights, then the court must invalidate it. If 
the courts presume that the legislative branch has acted properly and give 
deference to the evaluation of the statute, the protection of individual liberty 
afforded by the Republican Constitution will be weakened or lost altogether.（14） 
The prospect of vindicating individual rights through the democratic process 
was “entirely fanciful.” Only by empowering the individual to bring suit 
before the courts that will require government regulators to justify their 
restrictions on liberty as rational can these rights be effectively protected.（11） 
So, rather than defer to the legislature, the courts must critically examine 
whether the statute treats one group differently from another in light of the 
constitutional provision.（16） The question here is not whether judicial vindica-
tion of rights would result in well-functioning of political deliberation in the 
legislature. The purpose is that it will place individual rights higher than 
self-government.
　In this way, if we examine the changes in the republican constitutionalist’s 
understanding of the judiciary role, it proves that they are almost parallel to 
the shift from the compatibility of self-government and individual rights to 
the superiority of rights, as seen in chapter 3. It shows that they have aban-
doned the interactional relationship between rights and self-government, and 
have come to consider only the guarantee of rights as the role of courts. 
Their transition may indicate a gradual departure from the republican ideal 












　Third, on the possibility of being a promising alternative. Republicans often 
recognize that their thought, whose origins date back to the classical period, 
has gradually lost its influence in public life since the advent of liberalism in 
modern times. They sometimes believe that modern liberalism brought about 
many of today’s pathologies and that the clues to solving them are embedded 
in the republican tradition, which they hope to revive in various forms. In 
their view, republicanism is often formulated in terms of how it differs from 
liberalism as a renewed alternative. In other words, republicans planned to 
work out an innovative political or constitutional vision that would set their 
thought apart from liberalism.
　The former republicans in origin had a strong sense of presenting an 
alternative to liberalism. Sandel, who is usually seen as a communitarian 
theorist hostile to liberalism, opposes republicanism to liberalism in his view 
of freedom. According to him, in the liberal view, freedom is opposed to 
democracy and is defined as a constraint on self-government. Every person 
is said to be free as long as he is not bound by the majority rule. In contrast, 
republicans understand freedom as a result of self-government. People are 
free insofar as they belong to a community in which they share their destiny 
and participate in the decisions of the common good.（11） Pettit, who is seen to 
be neo-Roman and does not adopt the neo-Athenian view of freedom as self-
government, also symmetrizes the republican view of freedom with the lib-
eral one. According to him, liberal theorists have a view of freedom as non-
interference, because they recognize actual and physical interference as an 
infringement on freedom. Republicans, on the other hand, present a view of 
freedom as “non-domination,” in which freedom is violated by the mere pres-
ence of potential or arbitrary interference, without any actual interference.（18） 
In any case, republicans boasted that their interpretation of freedom was 
different from the liberal one and that they could identify the non-free situa-
tion differently from the liberal way.
　Sandel 2016, pp.21-28.
　Other republicans, such as Jean-Fabien Spitz and Quentin Skinner, have also pro-
posed a republican view of freedom, the “absence of dependence,” in contrast to the 







　However, the republican constitutionalists gradually relaxed their strict 
rivalry with the liberals. Already in Sunstein, republicanism was seen as 
compatible with, not opposed to, liberalism. He advocates the position of “lib-
eral republicanism” stating that the republican position he defends is not 
anti-liberal at all.（19） Republican elements, among which he raises as delibera-
tion, political equality, universalism, and citizenship, have had a strong influ-
ence on the liberal tradition.（80） The opposition between liberal and republi-
can ideas is generally false, and some elements of the liberal tradition are 
quite homogeneous with the republican view of politics. In many ways, 
republicanism and liberalism cannot be antonyms, and republican thought, 
when properly understood, is a prominent aspect of the liberal tradition.（81） 
Thus, he saw republicanism as more integrative with liberalism than before. 
Up to this point, however, the republicans were still conscious of the fact that 
the two positions had in origin been contrasted.
　The later republican constitutionalists, however, taking this trend further 
by completely melting the contrast between the two positions. It is true that 
Barnett tries to defend the Republican Constitution in contrast to the 
Democratic Constitution and that the supporters of the latter are seen as the 
so-called progressives, “liberals” in the political sense. However, the real con-
tent of democratic constitutionalism seems interest-group pluralism or the 
majority rule, which is the principle of action that drives realpolitik, rather 
than liberalism in the philosophical sense. Thus it is not liberalism but rather 
pluralism that he envisioned as a position in contrast to republicanism. On 
the other hand, what he is trying to defend in the name of the Republican 
Constitution is not self-government or political deliberation, but the basic 
freedoms and individual rights as we have seen. From this perspective, we 
might say that the ideas under the Republican Constitution he supports is 
not a republican strand but a liberal one. Moreover, given his understanding 
of individual rights as centered on property rights and his praise of interstate 
competition under the federal system as a free market, it would seem that 










alism, i.e. libertarianism. If that were the case, he should have called the 
interpretation of the Constitution he defended as “Libertarian,” not “Republican.” 
Calling the interpretation of the Constitution “republican,” although in fact 
libertarian, is not only misleading but seems to be a misrepresentation of 
republicanism.
　In this way, the republican constitutionalists are gradually loosening, and 
eventually melting down, the difference between republican and liberal con-
stitutionalism. It may weaken the ambition and willingness of republicans to 
tackle the task it set out in origin; to solve the difficulties yielded by liberal 
projects or to come up with solutions and constitutional views that differ from 
liberalism. Such a shift in republicanism seems to be chipping away at its 
critical base by assimilating itself into liberalism.
　Of course, how to view the relationship between republicanism, which 
inherits the legacy of the past, and liberalism, which holds its position as a 
public philosophy in contemporary political culture, is one of the central issues 
on which the republican theorists still disagree. On the one hand, some of 
them see it as a decisive opposition, such as Sandel, and on the other hand, 
others see it as a reconciliation, such as Sunstein. Moreover, others understand 
that republicanism provided the soil for the emergence of liberalism. I believe 
that this understanding is more appropriate, though it is not quite so simple 
and requires a careful and thorough examination of the history of thought. 
The relationship to liberalism is a conundrum that would continue to plague 
republicans. But I am not comfortable with using the label “republican” for 
the understanding of the Constitution that has libertarian undertones, as 
Barnett does. It is not only because it is a departure from the republican 
tradition, but also because it seems to close the way to a more promising 
understanding of the law than that offered by liberal constitutionalists.
７．Interim conclusion
　In this paper, we have examined the shift of republican constitutionalism. 
I do not repeat the summary here, for I put it at the beginning. Please refer 
to it.
　The position of republican constitutionalism, which emerged in the field of 
constitutional theory in the late 1980s, drew the attention of many critics for 







did not publish so vigorously on the subject after the 1990s. Barnett’s work, 
“Our Republican Constitution,” was expected to be a re-telling of republican 
constitutionalism and to herald a new revival of republicanism. But it has 
been somewhat disappointing. He wrote the book with an awareness of the 
political issues that were being debated in the U.S. at the time of its publica-
tion （the pros and cons of the so-called Obamacare）, as stated in the preface 
and other passages. It may be a “political” work - in the sense of a commen-
tary on current public events - rather than a study to develop a philosophi-
cal reflection on republicanism.
　However, I cannot help but feel uncomfortable that the central concepts of 
“the Republican Constitution” and “the Democratic Constitution,” which he 
uses as a device for his argument, are being used for convenience with a 
political agenda. He denounces that progressive Democrats opportunistically 
misused their democratic conception of the Constitution for other political 
purposes. On the contrary, he states, “［m］odern-day Republicans can be just 
as opportunistic about republicanism as Democrats are about democracy,” 
even promoting that they use the apparatus of their constitutional theory for 
political convenience.（82） This kind of argument raises the suspicion that the 
argument on judicial deference may also be changing opportunistically 
depending on the political inclinations of the Supreme Court - conservative 
or liberal. Such an argument does not seem to be a sincere and honest attempt 
to carry on the tradition of republicanism, but an act of self-destruction that 
arbitrarily distorts that tradition for political expediency.
　Republican constitutionalism has been and will continue to be a significant 
position that sets forth a different view of the Constitution from liberal con-
stitutionalism. Along with Lockean and Madisonian ideas, it interprets the 
Constitution not only as protecting individual rights but as providing for self-
government and political deliberation. For this not to end up as a temporary 
boom, we hope that it will be taken over seriously as a sincere theoretical 
effort, regardless of political trends.
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